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BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES
CORPORATION As AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF NEITHER PARTY~
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support
of neither party.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
IBM is a globally recognized leader in the field of
information technology research, development, design,
manufacturing, and related services. During IBM’s nearly
100-year history, its employees have included five Nobel
laureates, five National Medal of Science recipients, and eight
winners of the National Medal of Technology. The United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has granted
IBM tens of thousands of United States patents, including
more patents than any other corporate assignee for the past
twelve years. IBM is the proprietor of more patents claiming
computer-related inventions than any other entity in the
world. IBM is also ranked in the top two for patents issued
on business methods, as classified by the USPTO.2 IBM
believes it can provide a balanced view on important issues
implicated by this case -- namely, the patentability standard
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and particularly as it relates to
patenting of business methods.
1 In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus states
that this brief was authored in its entirety by the counsel listed herein.
No person or entity other than Amicus listed on the cover made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
Letters reflecting written consent of the parties to the submission of
this brief have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.
2 According to information available to IBM, it has been issued
308 patents on business methods as of December 13, 2005.
As a leading recipient, licensee, and licensor of patents,
amicus IBM is committed to maintaining the integrity of the
United States patent laws. IBM is particularly interested in
assuring that the statutory standard (35 U.S.C. § 101) for
patent eligibility of business methods is addressed in a
manner that is both rational and consistent with established
principles of patent law.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since this Court last interpreted section 101 of the patent
statute, see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981),
certain decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have
broadened the scope of subject matter deemed eligible for
patenting, particularly in the area of business methods. Under
the standard currently followed by the Federal Circuit, an
invention is eligible for patenting if "it merely achieves a
useful, concrete, and tangible result." State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Under this lenient standard, the section 101
inquiry has taken an "end-justifies-the-means" approach,
which has resulted in patents arising from a diverse range of
human behavior traditionally outside the realm of patent
protection, including economic analyses, artistic techniques,
athletic skills, and abstract methods of doing business. As
one Federal Circuit jurist remarked, under that court’s case
law, "virtually anything is patentable." Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1385, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Clevenger, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (citing
State Street, 149 E3d 1368).
Despite the significance of the issues surrounding subject
matter eligibility under section 101, particularly for business
methods, IBM believes that the facts of this case do not
present a suitable opportunity for analyzing and articulating
the proper scope of subject matter for patent eligibility. The
3present matter before the Court involves a medical diagnostic
procedure, rather than an inchoate business method or other
abstract technique. Moreover, the parties did not squarely
address the section 101 issue below and the resulting record
is thus not sufficiently developed with respect to the statutory
subject matter inquiry. IBM therefore respectfully suggests
that the Court not speak broadly to the issue of patentable
subject matter, but rather await a more appropriate case to
address this issue. Should, however, the Court decide to
address the scope of subject matter eligibility for business
methods, IBM wishes to provide its view on section 101 for
the Court’s consideration.
As a general matter, a robust notion of patentable subject
matter best serves the United States in the twenty-first
century. Within our innovation-driven economy, diverse
industries have contributed numerous technical advances that
are unquestionably suitable for patenting. The USPTO has,
for example, appropriately awarded patents in the
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, computer/electronics,
biomedical, financial, mechanical and other important fields.
Unfortunately, decisions of the Federal Circuit (like State
Street) have unduly expanded the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter for business methods. This broad scope stands
at odds with the Constitution and this Court’s consistent
statements that an invention must contribute to the "Progress
of [the]... useful Arts" in order to be eligible for patenting.
In that constitutional context, patentable advances must be
tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or alternatively,
must reside in the physical transformation of an article to a
"different state or thing." See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 70-71 (1972). The State Street standard overlooks this
Court’s precedent and fails to apply an important constraint
upon the patent system without any doctrinal justification or
alternative tempering principle.
4In the absence of a compelling rationale to alter the
understanding of "useful arts," IBM believes that this Court
should reaffirm its existing standard for subject matter
patentability which is restricted to inventions that involve
technological contributions -- namely, tangible products or
processes that either (i) are tied to a particular machine 
apparatus or (ii) cause transformation or reduction of 
article to a different state or thing, and in either instance
produce technologically beneficial results. IBM recognizes
that the Court has previously used language suggesting that
this standard may not be a rigid rule, but rather more akin to
a presumption. In the intervening years, however, no situation
has been presented to this Court which warrants any
exception to this rule. This test sets forth a reasonable and
balanced standard for subject matter eligibility.
The long-standing principles governing subject matter
eligible for patenting should be maintained such that, for
example, a method of painting a surface using the posterior
of an infant (U.S. Pat. No. 6,213,778) and a method for
making jury selection determinations (U.S. Pat. No.
6,607,389) are not patentable subject matter because they
do not produce technologically beneficial results. IBM
recognizes that some of its own business method patents may
include claims that might not satisfy this standard.
The Federal Circuit accomplished its shift in patent
policy without any evidence suggesting that incentives for
innovation are currently needed with respect to abstract
business methods and other non-technological innovations,
and without due consideration of the impact that such a shift
would have on the economy. Although no persuasive
justification prompted the abrupt allowance -- indeed
explosion -- of patents for abstract business methods, the
breadth of coverage of such patents has raised significant
concerns within the innovation community. Among them is
concern that such patents, because they are not restricted to
a specific technological contribution, may effectively appropriate
all conceivable solutions to a particular problem. Such an
overbroad monopoly thwarts progress of the useful arts by
precluding legitimate attempts to design around a patent and by
providing unjustified rewards beyond the contribution of the
inventor. As a result, should this Court speak to the issue of
statutory subject matter beyond the facts of this case, IBM
respectfully suggests that the Court should reaffirm, consistent
with its precedent on section 101, that a technological
contribution is required for subject matter patentability, thereby
denying patents on abstract or non-technological business
methods.
DIVERSE INDUSTRIES HAVE MADE TECHNICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS THAT APPROPRIATELY FALL
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
Throughout our history, the constitutional and statutory
standard for patent-eligible subject matter has been sufficiently
flexible to adapt to new technological innovations. For example,
during the Industrial Revolution, the Court in Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 781,791 (1877), held that an improved
method for manufacturing flour was patentable. More recently,
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980), the Court
held that a new life form, a microbe capable of digesting
petrochemicals, was patentable. At the dawn of the Information
Age, the Court held that a claim directed to a chemical process
which included a programmed igital computer was patentable.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-93. The USPTO has heeded the Court’s
direction, allowing patents on, inter alia, new pharmaceutical,
biotechnology and financial services inventions. 3 IBM fully
supports a robust scope of patentable subject matter for these
3 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,969,531 ("Sodium Hyaluronate
Microsphere), 6,967,096 ("Thermostable Peptisade") and 6,606,606
("Systems and Methods for Performing Integrated Financial
Transaction").
6and other important innovations which are rooted in
technological contributions. Further, IBM recognizes that the
patent system’s ability to adapt to new technologies is consistent
with the constitutional requirement of promoting the useful arts
and, in particular, that a measured evolution of the scope of
patentable subject matter is an important incentive for pioneering
innovations.
Turning to the recent burst of business method patents and
the significance of the issues surrounding subject matter
eligibility of business methods, IBM believes that the facts of
this case do not present a suitable predicate for broadly analyzing
and articulating the proper scope of subject matter patentability
under section 101. First, while IBM expresses no view on the
merits of this case, the present matter before the Court involves
a medical diagnostic procedure,4 rather than an inchoate business
method or other abstract technique. Second, the petitioner failed
to preserve the issue of patentable subject matter in the lower
courts or develop a complete record for its review. The petitioner
did not, either at trial or on appeal, challenge the validity of the
patent as being directed to non-statutory subject matter?
While the question on which certiorari was granted is
narrower than that posed to the Government, 6 IBM submits
4 The patent is directed to methods for assaying samples of body
tissues to determine total homocysteine levels and methods for
diagnosing vitamin B deficiency based on the elevated homocysteine
levels. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, col. 3, 11.6-62.
5 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12,
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2005) (No. 04-607).
6 When the petition for certiorari was pending, this Court asked
for the Government’s views on the following question: "Is the patent
invalid because one cannot patent ’laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas’? Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)."
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 125 Sup. Ct. 1413
(2005).
this brief to address the subject of patent eligibility under
section 101, particularly for business methods, in the event
the Court decides to undertake a broad review of subject
matter patentability.
II. THE SCOPE OFPATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
HAS BEEN EXPANDED BEYOND THE LIMITS
ESTABLISHED BY TIlE CONSTITUTION AND
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT
The Constitution And This Court’s Precedent
Establish Limits Upon The Subject Matter
Eligible For Patenting
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See THE FEDERALIST NO. XLIII,
at 294 (James Madison) (M. Walter Dunne 1901) ("The 
to useful inventions.., belong to the inventors."). Historical
context confirms that the Constitution restricts the scope of
patent eligible subject matter. For example, the English
Statute of Monopolies of 1623, upon which the United States
patent system is largely based, provided an exception to the
general prohibition against monopolies by granting a
"privilege for the term of fourteen years or under [for] the
sole working or making any manner of new manufactures
... to the.., inventor .... " Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21
Jac. 1, c.3 (Eng.), reprinted in 9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
oN PATENTS, App. 8-3 (2005). Notably, that Statute eliminated
8commercial practices from the scope of patentable
exclusivity:
[T]hose who formulated the Constitution were
familiar with the long struggle over monopolies
so prominent in English history, where exclusive
rights to engage even in ordinary business
activities were granted so frequently by the Crown
for the financial benefits accruing to the Crown
only. It was desired that in this country any
Government grant of a monopoly for even a
limited time should be limited to those things
which serve in the promotion of science and the
useful arts.
In re Yuan, 188 E2d 377, 380 (C.C.RA. 1951) (emphasis
added). Contemporaneous use of the term "useful art" by
the Founding Fathers further confirms that patent-eligible
subject matter is limited to technological or industrial
innovations. The term "useful arts" was used in the context
of the production of goods and the industrial, mechanical
and manual arts, days before the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 by a delegate to that Convention. 7 Likewise,
7 "Under all the disadvantages which have attended
manufactures and the useful arts, it must afford the most comfortable
reflection to every patriotic mind to observe their progress in the
United States and particularly in Pennsylvania .... Permit me
however to mention them under their general heads: meal of all kinds,
ships and boats, malt and distilled liquors, potash, gunpowder,
cordage, loaf-sugar, pasteboard, cards and paper of every kind, books
in various languages, snuff, tobacco, starch, cannon, musquets,
anchors, nails, and very many other articles of iron, bricks, tiles,
potters ware, mill-stones, and other stone work, cabinet work, trunks
and Windsor chairs, carriages and harness of all kinds .... " Tench
Coxe, Delegate to the 1787 Constitutional Convention from
Pennsylvania, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American
(Cont’d)
Alexander Hamilton praised the patent system as a way of
encouraging manufacturing industries and "[inventions]
which relate to machinery" in the United States. ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: REPORT ON
MANUFACTURES (Dec. 5, 1791) 115-16, 175-76 (Jacob 
Cooke ed., Harper & Row 1964).
Consistent with the constitutional foundation, the current
patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.
This Court has long held that the first three categories
enumerated in section 101 -- machines, manufactures and
compositions of matter -- refer to physical products.
The Court has defined the term "machine" in section 101 to
mean "a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain
devices and combination of devices." Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 531,570 (1864). "’Manufacture’" in section 
means "’the production of articles for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
(Cont’d)
Manufactures: Convened for the Purpose of Establishing a Society
for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, Read
in the University of Pennsylvania, on Thursday the 9th of August
1787, 17-18 (R. Aitkin & Son 1787) (emphasis added); see also
Joseph Barnes, Treatise on the Justice, Policy, and Utility of
Establishing an Effectual System for Promoting the Progress of
Useful Arts 4 (Francis Bailey 1792) (Patentable invention "consists
in discoveries in science, and in the useful arts; by means of which
agriculture, navigation, manufactures, and manual labor are, not only
facilitated, but much promoted; and, indeed, to these they owe their
present state of perfection.").
10
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-
labor or by machinery.’" Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
"[C]omposition of matter" has been defined as "all
compositions of two or more substances and.., all composite
articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids,
powders or solids." Id.
The fourth section 101 category -- "process" -- is
defined in the patent statute as:
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or material.
35 U.S.C. § 100(b). Although the meaning of the terms
"process, art or method" is broad on its face, this Court’s
precedent "forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101."
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); see also Diehr,
450 U.S. at 183 ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing."). In particular, this
Court has consistently distinguished between concrete,
specific and technologically-grounded aspects of innovative
contributions, which are protectable via the patent system,
from underlying abstract or general principles, which are not.
In an early landmark decision regarding patentable
subject matter, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113
(1854), the Court revoked Morse’s eighth claim, which
recited:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific
machinery or parts of machinery described in the
foregoing specification and claims; the essence
11
of my invention being the use of the motive power
of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
electro-magnetism, however developed for
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs,
or letters, at any distances, being a new
application of that power of which I claim to be
the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. at 112 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that the
claim was "not warranted by law" because it would protect,
and thereby prevent use of, all conceivable solutions to
accomplish the recited result. Id. at 113.
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by
what process or machinery the result is
accomplished. For aught that we now know some
future inventor, in the onward march of science,
may discover a mode of writing or printing at a
distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or
combination set forth in the plaintiff’s
specification .... But yet if it is covered by this
patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public
have the benefit of it without the permission of
this patentee.
Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added). The Court explained that
Morse was only entitled to a patent for the method of using
electro-magnetism to print marks or signs at a distance that
he actually invented: "he has not discovered that the electro-
magnetic current, used as a motive power, in any other
method, and with any other combination, will do as well."
Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
Twenty years later, in Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874), the Court invalidated 
12
claim reciting a rubber eraser having a hole to accept a pencil,
explaining "an idea of itself is not patentable, but a new
device by which it may be made practically useful is."
O’Reilly and Rubber-Tip Pencil are bedrock cases for
determining the patent eligibility of subject matter. In the
first instance, both cases confirm that the patent system does
not protect all types of processes nor does it protect abstract
ideas. These cases also reinforce the important policy goal
of maintaining "basic tools of scientific and technological
work" within the public domain. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S.
at 67. O ’Reilly in particular makes clear that process patents
should not be allowed to appropriate all solutions to a
problem. This Court has consistently applied the fundamental
principles announced in O’Reilly and Rubber-Tip Pencil in
the intervening years.
Notably, in a trilogy of cases decided at the dawn of the
Information Age, the Court considered computer-related
inventions and confirmed its early precedent as applied to
new fields of endeavor. In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at
64, the patent claimed a "method for converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals." "The
claims were not limited to any particular art or technology,
to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular
end use." Id. The claims "purported to cover any use of the
claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of any
type." Id.
The question presented to the Court in Gottschalk was
"whether the method described and claimed was a ’process’
within the meaning of the Patent Act." Id. After reviewing a
number of early decisions, the Court held that the claimed
method was not patentable. Id. at 71-73. Much as "one may
not patent an idea," one may not patent the "formula for
converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals." Id. at
13
71. "[T]he mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in connection with a
digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is
affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself." Id. at 71-72.
In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that
the "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ’to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines."
Id. at 70. See, e.g., Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214
U.S. 366, 385-86 (1909) (sustaining a patent on a process
for expanding metal that involved mechanical operations).
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 involved claims drawn
to a method for computing an "alarm limit" on any process
variable involved in the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons. When a process variable, such as temperature,
pressure, or flow rate, exceeded a predetermined "alarm
limit," an alarm signaled "an abnormal condition indicating
either inefficiency or perhaps danger." Id. The only difference
between the claimed method and the previous conventional
methods was the mathematical algorithm or formula used to
calculate the alarm limit. See id. at 585-86.
The Court held that the claim was ineligible for patenting
because it simply provided a formula for computing an
updated alarm limit. Id. at 594-96. The application did not
explain how to "select the appropriate margin of safety, the
weighing factor, or any other variables .... [n]or [did] it...
contain any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at
work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means
of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system."
Id. at 586.
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Following the Gottschalk decision, the Court in Parker
confirmed that a process does not automatically fall within
the patentable subject matter of section 101 merely because
a process implements a principle or mathematical formula
in some specific fashion. See Parker, 437 U.S. at 593. To
permit otherwise "would make the determination of
patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman’s
art and would ill serve the principles underlying the
prohibition against patents for ’ideas’ or phenomena of
nature." Id. "The rule that the discovery of a law of nature
cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural
phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of
’discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect." Id. An
inventive application of a mathematical formula, principle
or phenomenon of nature may be patented, but patentability
cannot be supported "unless there is some other inventive
concept in its application." Id. at 594.
Furthermore, the Court stated that "post-solution
activity" -- the adjustment of the alarm limit to the figure
computed according to the formula -- cannot "transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process." Id. at 590.
"A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-
solution activity to almost any mathematical formula . . .
[however, the] concept of patentable subject matter under
§ 101 is not ’like a nose of wax which may be turned and
twisted in any direction .... ’" Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar,
119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)).
In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177, the invention was
"a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into
cured precision products." According to the patent, the
industry had been unable "to obtain uniformly accurate cures
because the temperature of the molding press could not be
precisely measured, thus making it difficult to... determine
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cure time." Id. at 178. To overcome this problem, the method
required, inter alia, constantly measuring the actual
temperature inside the mold and then automatically feeding
the temperature measurements into a computer which would
repeatedly recalculate the cure time by use of a well-known
equation. See id.
This Court held the claims to be patentable because
"a physical and chemical process for molding precision
synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 categories
of possibly patentable subject matter." Id. at 184. Here, the
"claims were not directed to a mathematical algorithm or an
improved method of calculation but rather recited an
improved process for molding rubber articles by solving a
practical problem which had arisen in the molding of rubber
products." Id. at 181. "[T]he transformation of an article, in
this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state
or thing cannot be disputed." Id. at 184. In fact, "[i]ndustrial
processes such as this are the types which have historically
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws."
Id.
The Court further stated, "[a] claim drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory
simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer
program, or digital computer." Id. at 187. Rather, "when a
claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101." Id. at 192.
On the other hand, "laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are excluded from patent protection.
Id. at 185. Scientific truths, or the mathematical expression
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of them, are similarly outside the patent system, but "’a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be [patentable].’" Id. at 188 (quoting
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp of Am., 306
U.S. 86, 94 (1939)).
In these and other relevant patent cases, the Court has
developed several cogent principles that constrain subject
matter patentability:
"Excluded from.., patent protection are laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
"A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented,
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right." Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
175 (1853).
One may not patent an idea. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at
71 (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. at 507).
"Phenomena of nature, though just discovered,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work." Gottschalk, 409
U.S. at 67.
Mathematical algorithms are not patentable.
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186; Parker, 437 U.S. at 586;
Gottschalk, 450 U.S. at 71-72.
One cannot patent all solutions to a problem.
See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113.
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"’It is for the discovery or invention of some
practical method or means of producing a beneficial
result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for
the result or effect itself.’" Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182
n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 55 U.S. (15 How.)
252,267-68 (1854)).
Insignificant post-solution activity or limiting an
abstract idea to one technological environment will
not render an abstract idea patentable. See Diehr,
450 U.S. at 191-92; Parker, 427 U.S. at 590.
"A claim covers and secures a process, a machine, a
manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design,
but never the function or result of either, nor the
scientific explanation of their operation." Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373
(1996) (emphasis added).
The Gravamen Of This Court’s Precedent Is That
Subject Matter Patentability Is Restricted
To Inventions That Involve Technological
Contributions
IBM believes a comprehensive understanding of subject
matter patentability can be deduced directly from this Court’s
precedent. More specifically, patentable subject matter is
restricted to inventions that involve technological
contributions -- namely, tangible products or processes that
either (i) are tied to a particular machine or apparatus 
(ii) cause transformation or reduction of an article to 
different state or thing, and in either instance produce
technologically beneficial results. In summarizing this
Court’s existing standard, IBM recognizes that the Court has
used language suggesting that it may not be a definitive rule,
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but rather more akin to a presumption. 8 In the intervening
years, however, no situation has been presented to this Court
to justify an exception to this Court’s standard. This test sets
forth a reasonable and balanced standard for subject matter
eligibility.
The requirement for technological contribution is also
consistent with numerous cases of this Court, referring to
patents as properly directed toward "technology" and
"technological growth and industrial innovation." See, e.g.,
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64 ("The claims were not limited to
any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus
or machinery, or to any particular end use.") (emphasis
added); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 ("Industrial processes . . 
have historically been eligible to receive the protection of
our patent laws.") (emphasis added); Pfaffv. Wells, 525 U.S.
55, 63 (1998) ("the patent system represents a carefully
crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology,
in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time.") (emphasis added); Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,150-51 (1989) (same); Markman,
517 U.S. at 390 ("Congress created the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent
cases, H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981), observing
that increased uniformity would ’strengthen the United States
patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth
and industrial innovation.’") (emphasis added). IBM has
been unable to find any cases from this Court that are
inconsistent with the technological contribution requirement.
8 The Gottschalk Court stated: "It is argued that a process patent
must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate
to change articles or materials to a ’different state or thing.’ We do not
hold that no process could ever qualify if it did not meet he requirements
of our prior precedents." Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
However, the Court has not undertaken to define circumstances where
a process outside its precedent would qualify for patent protection.
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Until recent years, lower courts had also recognized that
patenting was confined to the "technological arts," a modern
term recognized as synonymous with the phrase "useful arts"
as it appears in the Constitution. In re Waldbaum, 457 E2d
997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Bergy, 596 E2d 952, 959
(C.C.P.A. 1979) ("We have previously pointed out that 
present day equivalent of the term ’useful arts’ employed by
the Founding Fathers is ’technological arts.’") (emphasis
added), aff’d sub nom, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980); In re Musgrave, 431 E2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A.
1970) ("All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence
of operational steps a statutory ’process’ within 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the
progress of ’useful arts.’") (emphasis added).
This test is rooted in the constitutional requirement that
patents are granted to promote the progress of useful arts. In
historical context, the useful arts required a technological
contribution. This Court’s precedent reinforces the need for
a technological contribution for patent eligibility. A fair
reading of this Court’s precedent in the aggregate provides
the foundation for the standard that a claim to a process or
method is not patentable unless it either (i) is tied to 
particular machine or apparatus or (ii) causes transformation
or reduction of an article to a different state or thing, and in
either instance produces technologically beneficial results.
2O
Co The Decisions Of The Federal Circuit Have
Applied An Unjustifiably Expansive Standard
For Patent Eligibility Of Business Methods
A specific, and particularly troubling, arena where
Federal Circuit rulings diverge from this Court’s precedent
is the eligibility of business methods for patenting. IBM is
concerned over patenting methods of doing business lacking
a technical contribution.9
Historically, methods of doing business were not
patentable subject matter, 1° and the 1952 Patent Act did not
9 Examples of abstract business methods include U.S. Patent
Nos. 5,947,526 (claim 1 reciting method for tracking personal
expenditures) and 5,668,736 (claim 1 reciting method for remodeling
an existing building).
10 See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160
F. 467, 469-72 (2d Cir. 1908) ("cash-registering and account-
checking" unpatentable "system of transacting business disconnected
from the means for carrying out the system .... "); Ex Parte Turner,
1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 36-37 (method to secure reading of
advertisements not patentable because, inter alia, process carried
no physical effect; "a plan or theory of action which, if carried into
practice, could produce no physical results proceeding direct from
the operation of the theory or plan itself is not an art within the
meaning of the patent laws."); Ex Parte Abraham, 1869 Dec. Comm’r
Pat. 59 (method for detecting and preventing tax evasion by
employing stamps to be severed upon attachment to an article
unpatentable; "[i]t is contrary.., to the spirit of the law.., to grant
patents for methods of book-keeping .... "); Loew’s Drive-in
Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 553 (1 st Cir.
1949) (patent claiming arranging automobiles such that occupants
would have an unobstructed view of a screen or stage did "not involve
an exercise of the faculty of invention"); Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Marzall, 180 F.2d 26, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (method for testing
beverages and like products to make advance determination of
(Cont’d)
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change this principle. "Although the term ’process’ was not
added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952, a process [as shaped by
this Court’s precedent] has historically enjoyed patent
protection because it was considered a form of ’art’ as that
term was used in the 1793 Act." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citing
Coming, 56 U.S. (How. 15) at 267-68). In an oft-quoted
comment, Judge Rich explained that:
Section 101, entitled "Inventions patentable,"
enumerates the categories of inventions subject
to patenting. Of course, not every kind of an
invention can be patented. Invaluable though it
may be to individuals, the public, and national
defense, the invention of a more effective
organization of the materials in, and the
techniques of teaching a course in physics,
chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention
because it is outside of the enumerated [statutory]
categories .... Also outside that group is one of
the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper
service.
(Cont’d)
consumer eactions and preferences not "new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or any new and useful improvements thereof’); In re
Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (system of fighting
fires using standardized and interchangeable fire fighting equipment
not patentable subject matter; "a system of transacting business, apart
from the means for carrying out such system, is not within... [the
patent statute] ... nor is an abstract idea or theory, regardless of its
importance or the ingenuity with which it was conceived, apart from
the means for carrying such idea or theory into effect, patentable
subject matter."); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 982-83 (C.C.P.A. 1934)
(method of buying and selling stocks, wherein one party advertised
offer, another party accepted offer and such transaction was recorded,
constituted unpatentable method of doing business); In re Sterling,
70 F.2d 910, 911-12 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (patent application directed 
a particular arrangement of printed matter on bank checks and stubs
not patentable subject matter).
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Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH.
UMv. L. REV. 393,393-94 (1960).11
The dicta in the Federal Circuit decision in State Street,
however, created a dramatic sea-change in the patentability
of inchoate business methods. State Street involved a
patent generally directed to a data processing system for
implementing an investment structure which was developed
for use in Signature’s business as an administrator and
accounting agent for mutual funds. 149 E3d at 1370.
The district court invalidated the patent for failure to
claim statutory subject matter under section 101. Id.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that
the claims were directed to patentable subject matter because
they produced a "useful, concrete and tangible result."
Id. at 1375.
[T]he transformation of data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application of a
mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation,
because it produces "a useful, concrete and
tangible result" -- a final share price momentarily
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and
even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades.
Id. at 1373.
While the Federal Circuit’s holding in State Street
regarding the claim at issue can be justified, IBM believes
11 Judge Rich was one of the principle drafters of the 1952 Patent
Act as well as a Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from 1957 to 1999.
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that dicta in the decision ignited the explosion of non-
technological business method patents seen today. The
Federal Circuit concluded that the claim was drawn to a
system, not a method of doing business, and it included a
number of structural elements as limitations -- thus, the
claimed invention was a machine that implemented a process.
However, the expansive dicta in State Street are inconsistent
with this Court’s precedent. See, e.g., id. at 1375 ("We take
this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception [i.e., that
business methods are not patentable] to rest.").
In the context of business methods, the broad dicta in
State Street have reduced the historically separate subject
matter requirement of section 101 to a mere "practical utility"
determination. State Street, 149 E3d at 1375 ("The question
of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter
should not focus on which of the four categories of subject
matter a claim is directed to -- process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter -- but rather on the
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular,
its practical utility.") (emphasis added).
The contrast in approach is clearly evident from this
Court’s precedent. In Parker v. Flook, for example, the case
turned "entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the
Patent Act, which describes the subject matter that is eligible
for patent protection." 437 U.S. at 588. Whether subject
matter is eligible for patenting is an entirely separate inquiry
from whether the claimed invention provides some useful
result, i.e., whether it meets the separate utility requirement
of section 101. See id.
No decision of this Court supports the broad proposition
that merely because a method yields a useful result it should
ipsofacto be eligible for patenting, as is the current standard
applied by the Federal Circuit. Rather, this Court has
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recognized that the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a
distinct and separate test from the eligibility requirement of
section 101. A mere "useful result" standard is much too lenient
to determine whether subject matter is eligible for patenting.
As Judge Rich so aptly stated decades ago, the diaper service
(prior to the advent of disposable diapers) was undoubtedly one
of the greatest business creations in its day, invaluable to
countless individuals. However, despite its usefulness, the diaper
service does not fall within one of the four enumerated categories
of section 101. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability,
28 GEO. WASh. UNIV. L. REV. 393, 39394 (1960).
The standard espoused in State Street merely addresses the
usefulness of the outcome. See State Street, 149 E3d at 1375.
This standard is at odds with the principles of patentability
established by the Constitution and this Court and the ambit of
patentable subject matter as established in the 1952 Patent Act.
Ignoring the enumerated categories of statutory subject matter
as a threshold inquiry of patentability makes the categories mere
drafting protocols. See Parker, 437 U.S. at 590 (cautioning that
a competent draftsmen could attach some post-solution activity
to "transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process" within section 101).
Although State Street purported to quote from Diehr that
"anything under the sun made by man is patentable," that quote
was taken out of context. State Street, 149 E3d at 1373.
Congressional reports employed that phrase only with respect
to machines and manufactures. See S. R~. No. 82-1979, at 2399
(1952) ("A person may have ’invented’ a machine or 
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is
made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled."); H. R. REp.
No. 82-1923 (1952) (same). Certainly, section 101 does not 
"anything under the sun made by man" is patentable subject
matter, but rather references four specific categories.
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Acquiescing to the demands of patent applicants and the
State Street dicta, the USPTO has now dramatically changed
course as well. Thus, for example, the USPTO recently
promulgated "interim guidelines" stating that an invention
need not lie within the "technological arts" to be patented.
Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 1300 O.G. 142, No. 4 (Nov. 22, 2005).12
Issued patents from such diverse areas as architecture,
athletics, insurance, painting, psychology, and the law itself,
reveal just how far afield the patent system has gone in
granting patents in virtually any area of human endeavor,
such as teaching a golf putting stroke or a method for lifting
a box.13
~2 In reaction to the sweeping impact of State Street, Congress
passed the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 273,
to provide a defense to infringement of a business method patent if
the accused infringer "had, acting in good faith, actually reduced
the subject matter to practice at least 1 year before the effective
filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter
before the effective filing date of such patent." First Inventor Defense
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000)). Beyond that limited purpose,
there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest Congress intended
to make any other changes to the United States patent laws. Thus,
this Court’s precedent on section 101 patent eligibility for business
methods -- as articulated in the Gottschalk-Parker-Diehr trilogy --
remains the controlling standard.
~3 See, e.g., U.S. Patents Nos. 5,498,162 ("Method For
Demonstrating a Lifting Technique"), 6,447,403 ("Method and
Apparatus for Improving Putting Skill"), 6,912,510 ("Methods 
Exchanging an Obligation"), 5,190,458 ("Character Assessment
Method"), and 5,809,484 ("Method and Apparatus For Funding
Education By Acquiring Shares of Students Future Earnings").
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NO SOUND INNOVATION POLICY SUPPORTS
PATENTS ON NON-TECHNOLOGICAL METHODS
OF DOING BUSINESS
Not only is an unrestricted sense of patentable subject
matter disfavored by sound innovation policy, it conflicts
with the requirement, stipulated by the Constitution and
consistently articulated by this Court’s precedent, that
patentable subject matter must fall within the "useful arts."
A. Patent-Based Incentives Are Not Needed To Spur
Business Method Innovation
The decision to issue patents on particular subject matter
involves, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, a determination
of those "’things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent .... ’" Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
In this regard, the evidence suggesting a sudden need
for patent-based incentives to promote the development of
business concepts is conspicuous by its absence. "Nowhere
in the substantial literature on innovation is there a statement
that the United States economy suffers from a lack of
innovation in methods of doing business. Compared with
the business practices of comparable economies we seem to
be innovators .... " Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank
Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection
for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 92 (1999). Among the reasons for the
persistent favorable record of commercial entrepreneurship
in the United States are existing federal and state regimes,
including unfair competition law, trade secrets, copyright,
and the misappropriation doctrine, that have long policed
free riding and allowed business pioneers to reap the rewards
of their ideas. See id. at 93. In conjunction with market-based
27
incentives, including the desire to seize first-mover and
learning-curve advantages, the current legal framework has
resulted in a flourishing environment for business innovation
in the United States. No plausible argument supports the view
that protecting non-technological business methods through
our patent system is needed to solve a market failure problem,
fill a legal void, or ultimately enhance social welfare.
B. Business Method Patenting Raises Significant
Competitive Concerns
Although no convincing justification exists for allowing
patents on non-technological methods of doing business and
other abstract ideas, the breadth of coverage of such patents
has raised significant competitive concerns. Among them is
that such patents are not restricted by the Constitution and
the precedent articulated by this Court. Rather, they may
effectively appropriate all possible solutions to a particular
problem. This direct restraint upon the ability of competitors
to develop alternatives to the patented invention thwarts a
principal aspiration of the patent system, fostering new
alternatives. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc.,
932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around
patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent system
works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress
in the useful arts, its constitutional purpose."); Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("Until [a] process claim
has been reduced to production of a product shown to be
useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable
of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and
perhaps unknowable area.").
Consider, for example, the ubiquitous automated teller
machine ("ATM"). A review of the patent rolls reveals
numerous ATM patents concerning such mechanical,
electrical, and computer-implemented inventions as card
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readers, touch screens, cash dispensers, statement printers,
and antitheft mechanisms. As evidenced by the robust
competition within the contemporary ATM industry, such
patents have both preserved the incentives of industry
participants to innovate, yet allowed their competitors to
market alternative designs. However, in view of the Federal
Circuit’s endorsement of patents on inchoate business
methods, a contemporary inventor’ s claim to the very concept
of an ATM would be considered eligible for patenting under
section 101. Much like claim 8 of Morse’s telegraphy patent,
such a patent would effectively prevent all others from
designing alternative mechanisms for meeting the same
marketplace needs. The potential adverse impact of this
hypothetical patent upon competition not just in the ATM
industry, but within the banking industry itself, is apparent.
The lack of a plausible justification for patents on
abstract business methods and human behavior, coupled with
the anticompetitive consequences of issuing these patents,
counsels that this Court continue to restrict patentable subject
matter to instantiated products and processes. Modern
society’s dizzying pace of technological change, with its
accompanying changes to marketplace conditions and
commercial practices, should by no means lead to an
alteration of these established principles.
Nor does this Court’s recognition that the patent system
should keep apace with unforeseeable fields of scientific or
technological discovery, see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315-
16, compel a contrary result. Abstract business concepts are
not an unforeseeable field, and, in fact, they long predate the
patent system. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of
the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.L. REV. 1139, 1145-46
(1999). Moreover, by definition, abstract or inchoate business
methods are not scientific or technological. See Malla
Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method
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Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and
Constitutional History, 28 RUT6ERS CoMe. & TECH. L.J. 61,
77-78 (2002).
In State Street, the Federal Circuit articulated broad-
sweeping dicta without making an inquiry into whether the
patenting of inchoate methods of doing business raises
competitive concerns and whether traditional patent-based
incentives were actually needed to spur methods of doing
business. "Jefferson saw clearly the difficulty in ’drawing a
line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.’" Graham, 383 U.S. at 9. This Court should return the
ambit of patentable subject matter to that range of innovation
which truly justifies tolerating the "embarrassment of an
exclusive patent."
3O
CONCLUSION
Should the Court decide to address the issues of subject
matter eligibility for business methods, for all the foregoing
reasons, the Court should hold that patentable subject matter
under section 101 is restricted to inventions that involve
technological contributions -- namely, tangible products or
processes that either (i) are tied to a particular machine 
apparatus or (ii) cause transformation or reduction of 
article to a different state or thing, and in either instance
produce technologically beneficial results.
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